Clarity and Confusion: RICO\u27s Recent Trips to the United States Supreme Court by Gordon, Randy D.
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2011
Clarity and Confusion: RICO's Recent Trips to the
United States Supreme Court
Randy D. Gordon
Texas A&M University School of Law, rdgordon@law.tamu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Randy D. Gordon, Clarity and Confusion: RICO's Recent Trips to the United States Supreme Court, 85 Tulane L. Rev. 677 (2011).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1038
Clarity and Confusion: RICO's Recent Trips
to the United States Supreme Court
Randy D. Gordon*
The complicated structumr ofthe Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act has
bedeviled courts and litgants since its adoption four decades ago. Two questions have recurred
with some fwquency Fist is victim reliance an element of a civd RICO claim pedicated on
allegations offraud? Second what is the dfference between an illegal association-in-fact and an
ordinary civil conspiracy? In a sedes of three cent cases, the United States Supreme Court
brought much needed cladty to the tu-stquestion. Butin anotherrecent case, the Court upended
decades of cheuit-court prcedent holdig that an actionable association-in-fact must embody a
set of structual attabutes that would not ordhiarly be present in a conspiracy 7his Aricle
analyzes these new cases, puts them in histoncal context and discusses their likely ramifcations
forcivilRICOlitigadon.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last five years, the United States Supreme Court has
taken and decided four Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) cases'-a significant number for a narrow
corner of the law. Three of the cases bring significant clarity to the
question of whether a fraud-based civil RICO claim will lie where the
plaintiff was not the recipient of the alleged fraudulent statements.2
The other case radically redefines the outward bounds of a RICO
"enterprise," which will have enormous consequences for criminal and
civil RICO cases alike.' In some ways, these two categories of cases
are representative of the tensions that arise between and within courts
that at once embrace criminal RICO as an effective law enforcement
tool and disdain civil RICO as a plaintiff-friendly boondoggle.4 So
lower courts and practitioners must continue, for now, to wrestle with
the twin vagaries wrought by the language of the statute itself and the
Supreme Court's failure to fashion full normative coherence between
RICO's criminal and civil strands.
II. UNTANGLING RICO
As I have argued elsewhere, and will not belabor here, the
structural complexity and expansive language of the RICO statute,
when coupled with the different (and often competing) policy aims
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 92 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006)); see Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York,
130 S. Ct. 983 (2010); Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237 (2009); Bridge v. Phoenix
Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451
(2006).
2. See Hend 130 S. Ct. at 985; Bridge, 533 U.S. at 641-42; Anza, 547 U.S. at 458-
61.
3. See Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2237.
4. See, eg., Michael Goldsmith & Evan S. Tilton, Proximate Cause in Civl
Racketeering Cases: The Misplaced Role of Victzm Reliance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 83,
92-93 (2002).
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behind criminal law enforcement and civil litigation, have forced
courts to interpret the statute in ways that would make it effective, yet
bounded.! In one respect, this interpretive conundrum is simply an
instantiation of the routine task that courts are well enough equipped to
handle when faced with vague or overly expansive statutory terms.
For example, courts quickly recognized that section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act would, if applied literally, make all contracts illegal and
therefore placed a "reasonableness" gloss on the statutory text.' But
the interpretive dilemmas that RICO poses are not so easily resolved
for at least two reasons: one structurally grounded and one policy
grounded.
First, RICO has a complicated structure. A plaintiff attempting to
state a civil RICO claim must show that he was injured "by reason of"
a criminal RICO violation, which requires that he plead such a
violation, which in turn requires him to identify the predicate
commission of certain specified crimes (e.g., mail or wire fraud) and
satisfy certain defined terms (e.g., pleading the existence of an
"enterprise").' To describe this structure is to demonstrate both its
complexity and difficulty.
Second, the government enforcement and private litigation aims
under RICO overlap less than, for instance, they do under the federal
antitrust laws. Mainly, criminal and civil litigation tend to target (and
in the case of tag along suits actually track) the same type of behavior.
In fact, the difference is one of degree rather than kind: federal
enforcement targets "hard core" violations like price fixing, whereas
private litigation in addition sweeps in actions such as tying, boycotts,
5. See generally Randy D. Gordon, Crimes That Count Twice: A Reexammation of
RICOk Nexus Requirements Under 18 USC §§ 1962(c) and 1964(c), 32 VT. L. REv. 171
(2007) [hereinafter Gordon, Crimes That Count Twice]; Randy D. Gordon, Retinking Civi
RICO: The Vexing Problem of Causation in Fraud-Based Claims Under 18 US C 1962(c),
39 U.S.F. L. REv. 319 (2005) [hereinafter Gordon, Rethding CivilRICOJ.
6. See, eg., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1911).
7. See, eg., Zellner v. Monroe Cnty. Mun. Waste Mgmt. Auth., No. 3:07-CV-1976,
2008 WL 2962595, at *7 (M.D. Pa. July 28, 2008); Johnson v. GEICO Cas. Co., 516 E Supp.
2d 351, 361 (D. Del. 2007); D'Addario v. Geller, 264 E Supp. 2d 367, 388 (E.D. Va. 2003);
see also Gordon, Rethinkig Civil RICO, supra note 5, at 323-24.
8. Eg, Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 118 (1994) (describing FTC
enforcement proceedings against title insurance companies followed by private "tag-along"
antitrust class actions); see also Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940 (2001) ("No sooner does the Antitrust Division bring a case, but the
states, and now the European Union, are likely to join the fray, followed at a distance by the
antitrust plaintiffs' class-action bar.").
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price discrimination, and exclusive dealing, all of which are easily
recognizable as potential antitrustviolations.'
RICO, in contrast, presents two very different faces. Government
prosecutions, on the one hand, look very much like what one would
expect from an antiracketeering, anti-Mafia statute: typical
indictments target drug distribution rings, interstate bank robbery
gangs, or the organized infiltration of a union or pension fund.0
Private RICO litigation, on the other hand, rarely involves Hollywood-
style mobster activity: typical complaints turn on allegations of fraud
in insurance, franchise, or other commercial transactions."
One might ask why antitrust litigation is relatively contained and
RICO litigation is not. One answer is that, although RICO's private
right of action provision is modeled on section 4 of the Clayton Act,12
the Supreme Court has read the two provisions quite differently. For
example, in Brmswick Corp. v Pueblo Bowl-O-Ma4 the Court held
that a private plaintiff, in addition to showing a substantive antitrust
violation that the government could pursue, must also show "antitrust
injury."" Early on, courts placed a similar gloss on RICO § 1964(c),
9. See generally Joseph P Bauer, Reflections on the Manifold Means of Enforcing
the Antitaust Laws: Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right., 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 303,
307-10 (2004); Kathryn K. Dyer & Garrett M. Liskey, Antitrst Violations, 45 AM. CRIM. L.
REv 195, 196 (2008).
10. Eg., Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2241 (2009) (bank robbery gang);
United States v. Daidone, 471 E3d 371, 373 (2d Cir. 2006) (loan sharking, extortion, witness
tampering, and murder); United States v. Polanco, 145 F.3d 536, 538-39 (2d Cir. 1998) (gun
and drug distribution, murder).
11. Eg, Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 130 S. Ct. 983, 986 (2010) (fraud in
connection with collection of sales taxes); Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S.
639, 639 (2008) (fraud and bid rigging); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 454
(2006) (fraud in connection with collection of sales taxes); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Watson, 94 F Supp. 2d 1027, 1031 (WD. Ark. 2000) ('[A] high percentage of civil RICO
cases, unlike typical antitrust cases, involve fraud claims."' (quoting Klehr v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 191 (1997))). As of 1985, "of the 270 known civil RICO cases at the
trial court level, 40% involved securities fraud, 37% common-law fraud in a commercial or
business setting, and only 9% 'allegations of criminal activity of a type generally associated
with professional criminals."' Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 n.16 (1985)
(quoting ABA SECTION OF CORP., BANKING, & Bus. LAw, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc Cvit RICO
TASK FORCE 55-56 (1985)). Additionally, "[r]oughly two fifths of all federal civil actions
under RICO are based on charges that the defendant committed mail or wire fraud." Horace
D. Nalle, Jr., CMi RICO Clahns PAedicated on Mail or Wim Fraud The Indispensability of
Reliance, 109 BANKING L.J. 272, 272 (1992) (footnote omitted).
12. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267 (1992) ("We have
repeatedly observed that Congress modeled § 1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the
federal antitrust laws, § 4 of the Clayton Act." (citations omitted)). Compare 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) (2006) i4th Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
13. 429 U.S. 477,489 (1977).
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demanding pleading and proof of "racketeering injury."4 But the
Supreme Court, in Sedma, SPR.L. v Imrex Co., soon removed this
and similar collars that the lower courts placed on civil RICO."
Thereafter, the path was clear for plaintiffs to bring civil claims that
had nothing to do with the prototypical crimes of gangsters (murder,
arson, extortion, etc.); allegations of fraud facilitated by two uses of
mail or wires would be enough to get a party started."
With the dampers on RICO's civil scope removed, lower courts
attempted to stanch the litigation flow in two ways. First, the courts
began to give new bite to the "by reason of" requirement of
§ 1964(c)." Second, the courts began to focus on the "enterprise"
element of § 1962, especially when the plaintiff alleged that the
enterprise was an "association-in-fact" (as opposed to a formal
business organization like a corporation or partnership).
14. E.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 495 (2d Cir. 1984), revyo 473
U.S. 479,486 (1985).
15. 473 U.S. at 486.
16. See generally Douglas E. Abrams, Civil RICO 3 Cause ofAction: The Landscape
After Sedima, 12 TUL. MAR. L.J. 19, 23-24 (1987); John E. Grenier & Sally S. Reilly, Civil
RICO-The Scope of Coverage After Sedima, 47 ALA. LAW. 260, 262 (1986); David A.
Furlow, Civil RICO Comes to Texas: A Review of Civil RICO Jurisprudence in the Fifth
Circuit and in the Federal Distict Courts of Texas, 37 BAYLOR L. REv 841, 844 (1985);
William H. Rivoir, III, Civil RICO-The Supreme Court Opens the Door to Commercial
Litigation, 90 CoM. L.J. 621, 621 (1985).
17. Eg., Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., 387 E3d 721, 728-29 (8th Cir. 2004)
(interpreting the "by reason of" requirement to "mean[] causation under the traditional tort
requirements of proximate or legal causation, as opposed to mere factual or 'but for'
causation" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Laura Ginger, Causation and Civil
RICO Standig: When Is a Plaintiff Injured "by Reason of" a RICO Violation., 64 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 849, 850-51, 864-66 (1990) (discussing the various interpretations by lower
courts of the "by reason of" requirement after Sedima).
18. See, eg., Crowe v. Henry, 43 E3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[A]ssociation-in-fact
enterprise (1) must have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering,
(2) must be an ongoing organization and (3) its members must function as a continuing unit
as shown by a hierarchical or consensual decision making structure." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Bachman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 178 E3d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding
that although defendants were involved in a conspiracy, "it is not an enterprise unless every
conspiracy is also an enterprise for RICO purposes, which the case law denies"); Elliott v.
Foufas, 867 E2d 877, 881 (5th Cir. 1989) (requiring plaintiffs to "plead specific facts which
establish that the association exists for purposes other than simply to commit the predicate
acts").
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III. PROXIMATE CAUSATION AND THIRD-PARTY RELIANCE:
HOLMES, ANZA, BRIDGE, AND HEMI
A. The General Standard for Proof of Causation Provided by
Holmes"
Private plaintiffs may recover for RICO violations only if they
can demonstrate injury "by reason of"20 those violations, a standard
that the Supreme Court first interpreted in Holmes v Securiies
Investor Protecdon Corp.2 1 In Holmes, the plaintiff, Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SIPC), an insurer, paid several million dollars
to cover claims of customers of two failed broker-dealers." SIPC
alleged that dozens of defendants concocted a fraudulent stock-
manipulation scheme that caused the failure of the two broker-
dealers.23 SIPC sued as the subrogee of customers who had not
purchased the manipulated securities but who nevertheless suffered
collateral injury when the broker-dealers collapsed.24 The Court was
thus called upon to decide whether a plaintiff has standing to sue for a
RICO violation that proximately injures a third party and also
derivatively injures the plaintiff.25 The legal question presented was
stated in the familiar terminology of tort law causation: is but for
causation sufficient to confer standing under § 1964(c)?26
As a threshold matter, the Court acknowledged that the statute's
"language can ... be read to mean that a plaintiff is injured 'by reason
of' a RICO violation, and therefore may recover, simply on showing
that the defendant violated § 1962, the plaintiff was injured, and the
defendant's violation was a 'but for' cause of plaintiff's injury."27 The
Court rejected this reading because: (1) § 1964(c) is modeled on
19. This Part borrows from Gordon, Rethinkig CivilRICO, supm note 5, at 329-32.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006) ("Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court. . . .").
21. 503 U.S. 258, 272-74 (1992).
22. Id at 261-63.
23. Id. at 262.
24. Id. at 263 n.5.
25. See id at 265 n.7. The petition to the Court for certiorari stated the question as:
Whether a party which was neither a purchaser nor a seller of securities, and for
that reason lacked standing to sue under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule l0b-5 thereunder, is free of that limitation on standing when
presenting essentially the same claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.
Id.
26. See id. at 266-67 n.12.
27. Id. at 265-66 (footnote omitted).
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section 4 of the Clayton Act," which provides a private right of action
for violations of the antitrust laws;29 and (2) section 4 was held to
"incorporate common-law principles of proximate causation."o The
Holmes Court thus concluded this reasoning should extend to
§ 1964(c):
We may fairly credit the 91st Congress, which enacted RICO, with
knowing the interpretation federal courts had given the words earlier
Congresses had used first in § 7 of the Sherman Act, and later in the
Clayton Act's § 4. It used the same words, and we can only assume it
intended them to have the same meaning that courts had already given
them."
In sum, as a matter of consistency, "[p]roximate cause is thus
required."3 2
The Court did not, however, articulate a test for determining
proximate cause." As a consequence, after Holmes, it was clear that
injury arising "merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third
person" will "stand at too remote a distance to recover."34 But at the
28. See Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 15 (2006)); Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267 ("We have repeatedly observed that Congress
modeled § 1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the federal antitrust laws, § 4 of the
Clayton Act, which reads in relevant part that 'any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee."' (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 15)).
29. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 266 ("This construction is hardly compelled, however, and
the very unlikelihood that Congress meant to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover
persuades us that RICO should not get such an expansive reading." (footnote omitted)).
30. See id. at 267-68 (stating that Congress's use of § 7 language in § 4 has been
interpreted by the Court to indicate the same congressional intent, and therefore the Court has
previously held that § 4 required a showing of proximate causation).
31. Id. at 268 (citations omitted).
3 2. Id.
33. Id. (referring the lower courts to "the judicial tools used to limit a person's
responsibility for the consequences of that person's own acts"). The Court also observed, "At
bottom, the notion of proximate cause reflects 'ideas of what justice demands, or of what is
administratively possible and convenient."' Id. (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
ToRTS § 41, at 264 (W Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)). The Court went on to say,
"Accordingly, among the many shapes this concept took at common law, was a demand for
some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged." Id.
(citation omitted).
34. Id. at 268-69; see also 1 J.G. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
99-100 (3d ed. 1903). Sutherland states:
Where the plakniff is injured by the defendant h conduct to a third person it is too
remote, if he sustains no other than a contract relation to such third person, or is
under contract obligation on his account, and the injury consists only in impairing
the ability or inclination of such third person to perform his part, or in increasing
TULANE LA WREVIEW [Vol. 85:677
same time, the Court stated that it could "not rule out" that
nonrecipients of misrepresentations could state a claim of fraud."
Without specific guidance on the point, lower courts oscillated across
the ground between these two poles and never achieved a consensus as
to the meaning of Holmes or a uniform approach even to recurring
instances of third-party fraud.16
the plaintiff's expense or labor of fulfilling such contract, unless the wrongful act is
willful for that purpose.
Id (emphasis added).
35. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272 n.19.
36. In deciding Bidge v Phoenir Bond & Indemnity Co. in 2008, the Supreme
Court recognized the split between circuits on the issue of reliance and third-party fraud left
open by Holmes. 553 U.S. 639, 646 (2008). Citing the Seventh Circuit decision it affirmed,
the Court noted that the "[t]hree other circuits that have considered this question agree ...
that the direct victim may recover through RICO whether or not it is the direct recipientof the
false statements." Id (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Ideal
Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 373 E3d 251, 263 (2d Cir. 2004), rev'don other grounds, Anza v.
Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (2006); Sys. Mgmt., Inc. v. Loiselle, 303 E3d 100,
103-04 (1st Cir. 2002); Mid Atl. Telecom, Inc. v. Long Distance Servs., Inc., 18 E3d 260,
263-64 (4th Cir. 1994)). The Court also noted that "two Circuits hold that the plaintiff must
show that it in fact relied on the defendant's misrepresentations." Id (citing Sikes v. Teleline,
Inc., 281 E3d 1350, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 2002); VanDenBroeck v. CommonPoint Mortg. Co.,
210 F3d 696, 701 (6th Cir. 2000)). The decisions in the lower courts reflect this split between
the circuits created by the uncertainty in Holmes. See, eg., Loiselle, 303 E3d at 104
("[R]eliance is a specialized condition that happens to have grown up with common law
fraud. Reliance is doubtless the most obvious way in which fraud can cause harm, but it is
not the only way .... There is no good reason here to depart from RICO's literal language by
importing a reliance requirement into RICO."); Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv.
Sys., 271 E3d 374, 381-82 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that plaintiff adequately stated a direct,
proximate relationship between its injury and defendant's pattern of racketeering activity,
while noting that the 'direct relation' requirement generally precludes recovery by a 'plaintiff
who complain[s] of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by
the defendant's acts' (alteration in original) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268)); Proctor &
Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 E3d 539, 564-65 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting, "[i]n general,
fraud addresses liability between persons with direct relationships-assured by the
requirement that a plaintiff has either been the target of fraud, or has relied upon the
fraudulent conduct of defendants," but concluding "[that] if [plaintiffs] customers relied on
the fraudulent rumor in making decisions ... this reliance suffices to show proximate
causation" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 140 E3d 494, 521 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that when a plaintiff's relationship
with a third party was the direct target of an alleged scheme, the plaintiff may pursue a RICO
claim); Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1318 (11th Cir.
1998) (finding that because misrepresentations the defendants allegedly made were directed
at a third party, not the plaintiff, the plaintiff lacked standing under § 1964(c) to prosecute a
claim based on these misrepresentations); Isr. Travel Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Isr. Identity Tours,
Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[T]here is no doubt that a producer injured by a
campaign of misinformation directed at its customers suffers an injury compensable under
the law of torts; it is not cut off by the proximate-causation and foreseeability requirements
.... RICO similarly allows suits when the predicate offenses influence customers and,
derivatively, injure business rivals."); MidAtl. Telecom, 18 E3d at 263-64 (holding that the
plaintiff could bring a RICO claim against defendant, whose actions allowed it to offer lower
684
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B. Definmg the Relationship Between Reliance and Causation:
Anza
Holmes may have definitively settled the then-open question of
whether both but for and proximate causation must be pled and proven
in a civil RICO case. But it did little to indicate exactly how plaintiffs
must do so, especially in misrepresentation cases." Finally, after
fifteen years, the Court stepped back into the fray and began to clarify
the muddle that had been created in the lower courts.38
In Anza v Ideal Steel Supply Corp., the Court considered
whether a competitor can be "injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation" within the meaning of § 1964(c),39 if the alleged
predicate acts of racketeering activity are mail and wire fraud but the
competitor was not the party defrauded and did not rely on the
fraudulent behavior. 40 Expanding on its holding in Holmes,4' the Court
answered the question in the negative.42
Ideal Steel Supply Corporation (Ideal) sued its chief competitor,
National Steel Supply, Inc., (National) and National's owners and
rates and lure away plaintiff's customers, even though defendant claimed any damages were
sustained by the customers, not the plaintiff); Cent. Distribs. of Beer, Inc. v. Conn, 5 E3d 181,
184 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that "fraud connected with mail or wire fraud must involve
misrepresentations or omissions flowing from the defendant to the plaintiff," thus precluding
the plaintiff's RICO claim); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 E2d 1295,
1311 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that because "[t]he phrase 'by reason of' requires that there be a
causal connection between the prohibited conduct and plaintiffs injury," to prove causation it
was necessary for the county to demonstrate at trial that defendant's misrepresentations were
relied upon by the State Public Service Commission, and that the misrepresentations caused
defendant's rate increases to be granted (internal quotation marks omitted)).
37. This Part borrows from Gordon, Rethinking Civil RICO, supra note 5, at 332-34.
38. Id.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006) ("Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court. . . .").
40. Anza, 547 U.S. at 458. For a fuller discussion of this case, see Gordon, Cimes
That Count Twice, supra note 5, at 192-98, and Randy D. Gordon & Samuel E. Joyner,
AnnualRICO Update, TEX. Bus. LmG. J., Summer 2006, at 9-13.
41. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (holding that a
plaintiff may sue under § 1964(c) of the RICO Act only if the alleged RICO violation was the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury).
42.
A RICO plaintiff cannot circumvent the proximate-cause requirement simply by
claiming that the defendant's aim was to increase market share at a competitor's
expense. When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the
central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the
plaintiff's injuries. In the instant case, the answer is no. We hold that Ideal's
§ 1962(c) claim does not satisfy the requirement of proximate causation.
Anza, 547 U.S. at 460-61 (citations omitted).
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operators, Joseph and Vincent Anza." Ideal alleged that National did
not charge New York's sales tax to cash-paying customers, thus
allowing it to reduce its prices without affecting its profit margin."
Further, National allegedly submitted fraudulent state sales tax reports
that intentionally omitted information concerning National's cash
transactions.45 Ideal claimed that by submitting these fraudulent tax
returns to conceal its conduct, National committed various acts of mail
and wire fraud violating § 1962(c).46 Ideal alleged that, under
§ 1964(c), it was injured "by reason of" National's scheme to avoid
state sales taxes and gain a competitive advantage over Ideal.47
Applying the principles of Holmes, the Supreme Court
concluded that Ideal could not maintain its § 1962(c) claim.48  The
Court explained that "the compensable injury flowing from a violation
of that provision 'necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts
sufficiently related to constitute a pattern, for the essence of the
violation is the commission of those acts in connection with the
conduct of an enterprise."" Here, Ideal alleged that the Anzas
conducted National's affairs through a pattern of mail fraud and wire
fraud.so According to the Court, "The direct victim of this conduct was
the State of New York, not Ideal. It was the State that was being
defrauded and the State that lost tax revenue as a result."' The Court
found that while "Ideal assert[ed] it suffered its own harms when
[National] failed to charge customers for the applicable sales tax[,]
[t]he cause of Ideal's asserted harms . . . is a set of actions (offering
lower prices) entirely distinct from the alleged RICO violation
(defrauding the State)."52
43. Id. at 453-54.
44. Id. at 454.
45. Id.
46. Id Ideal also brought a claim under § 1962(a), alleging that National had earned
profits by its "cash, no tax" scheme and used the profits to open an outlet in close proximity
to Ideal's sales facility. Id. at 455; Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 373 E3d 251, 255 (2d
Cir. 2004). Section 1962(a) makes it unlawful for any person who has received income
derived from a pattern of racketeering activity "to use or invest" that income "in acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of," an enterprise engaged in or affecting
interstate of foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006). According to Ideal, the opening
of National's new facility caused Ideal to lose "significant business and market share." Anza,
547 U.S. at 455.
47. SeeAnza, 547 U.S. at 457-58.
48. Id. at 457.
49. Id (quoting Sedima, S.PR.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,497 (1985)).
50. Id at 458.
51. Id
52. Id. The Court further reasoned:
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In contemplating the underpinnings of the directness
requirement, the Court identified several factors that reinforced its
conclusion. First, the Court noted "the difficulty that can arise when a
court attempts to ascertain the damages caused by some remote
action."" For example, the Court explained that while "[t]he injury
Ideal alleges is its own loss of sales resulting from National's
decreased prices for cash-paying customers," National "could have
lowered its prices for any number of reasons unconnected to the
asserted pattern of fraud."54 Additionally, "Ideal's lost sales could have
resulted from factors other than [National's] alleged acts of fraud.""
Second, "[t]he attenuated connection between Ideal's injury and
[National's] injurious conduct thus implicates ftmdamental concerns
expressed in Holmes."" The Court was particularly troubled by "the
speculative nature of the proceedings that would follow if Ideal were
permitted to maintain its claim." A district court would need to
calculate "the portion of National's price drop attributable to the
alleged pattern of racketeering activity," and then "calculate the portion
of Ideal's lost sales attributable to the relevant part of the price drop.""
According to the Court, "The element of proximate causation
recognized in Holmes is meant to prevent these types of intricate,
uncertain inquiries from overrunning RICO litigation."5 9 Third, "the
immediate victims of an alleged RICO violation can be expected to
The attenuation between the plaintiff's harms and the claimed RICO violation
arises from a different source in this case than in Holmes, where the alleged
violations were linked to the asserted harms only through the broker-dealers'
inability to meet their financial obligations. Nevertheless, the absence of
proximate causation is equally clear in both cases.
Id.
53. Id.
54. Id The court listed several other potential motivating factors. Id Namely,
National could have "received a cash inflow from some other source or concluded that the
additional sales would justify a smaller profit margin." Id.
55. Id at 459. The court noted, "Businesses lose and gain customers for many
reasons, and it would require a complex assessment to establish what portion of Ideal's lost
sales were the product of National's decreased prices." Id
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id at 460; see also Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992)
("[Riecognizing claims of the indirectly injured would force courts to adopt complicated
rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the
violative acts . . . ."). The Court added, "It has particular resonance when applied to claims
brought by economic competitors, which, if left unchecked, could blur the line between RICO
and the antitrust laws." Anza 547 U.S. at 460.
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vindicate the laws by pursuing their own claims."" In this instance, if
Ideal's allegations were true, the State of New York could "be expected
to pursue appropriate remedies."6' According to the Court, there was
"no need to broaden the universe of actionable harms to permit RICO
suits by parties who have been injured only indirectly."
It bears repeating that the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
notion that "intent" is a proxy for proximate cause.6 1 Writing for a
seven-member majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy declared:
This rationale does not accord with Holmes. A RICO plaintiff cannot
circumvent the proximate-cause requirement simply by claiming that
the defendant's aim was to increase market share at a competitor's
expense. When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate
causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged
violation led directly to the plaintiff's injur[y]. In the instant case, the
*64
answer is no.
The Court thus rejected Ideal's § 1962(c) claim, holding that any harm
Ideal suffered from National's alleged actions was too indirect to
support the claim.
Anza certainly clarified prior Supreme Court precedent requiring
that a plaintiff be directly injured by the alleged RICO predicate acts."
But it left open some important questions: e.g., whether a claim of
third-party fraud automatically fails for want of first-party reliance, or
whether foreseeability of harm can be sufficient to establish directness
of injury. The results following on the heels of Anza showed, by and
60. Anza, 547 U.S. at 460; see also Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70 ("[D]irectly injured
victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without
any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely.").
61. Anza, 547 U.S. at 460.
62. Id. The Court reached this conclusion in part by reasoning that the adjudication
of the State's claims would be relatively straightforward, while Ideal's claims would be
difficult to prove. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id at 460-61 (citation omitted).
65. Id The Court also vacated the Second Circuit's judgment with respect to Ideal's
§ 1962(a) claim. Id at 461-62. This claim alleged that National's tax scheme provided it
with funds to open a new store that attracted customers who otherwise would have purchased
from Ideal. Id. at 455. Without addressing § 1964(c) causation, the Second Circuit held that
this claim was adequately pleaded. See id. at 462. The Supreme Court refused, however, to
consider Ideal's § 1962(a) claim "without the benefit of the Court of Appeals' analysis"
regarding whether National's alleged RICO violation proximately caused the injuries Ideal
asserted. Id.
66. Id. at 459-60.
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large, a choke hold on anything other than cases of straightforward,
first-party fraud.
C Redefining the Relationship Between Reliance and Causation:
Bridge
To the extent that Anza could be read to mean that allegations of
third-party fraud cannot support a civil RICO claim, the Supreme
Court's very next RICO case, Bridge v Phoenix Bond & Indennity
Co., put that worry to rest." Boiled to its essence, the case arose out of
a bid-rigging scheme involving tax liens. Cook County, Illinois, like
many governmental subdivisions with taxing authority over property,
accumulates liens for unpaid taxes. Rather than hold the liens for
extended periods, the county periodically holds public auctions at
67. See, eg., Brown v. Cassens Transp. Co., 492 F3d 640, 643-46 (6th Cir. 2007),
vacateg 128 S. Ct. 2936, rev'd on remang 546 E3d 347, 357 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that
employees' claims that employer's mail- and wire-fraud scheme to deny them worker's
compensation benefits failed because they did not plead reliance); James Cape & Sons v.
PPC Constr. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 403-04 (7th Cir. 2006) (relying on Anza and affirming the
district court's dismissal of claims for lack of proximate causation and noting that a direct
causal connection is especially warranted where immediate victims can be expected to pursue
their own claims); G & G TIC, LLC v. Ala. Controls, Inc., No. 4:07-CV-162, 2008 WL
4457876, at *4-5 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2008) (dismissing contractor's RICO claims and
finding that the case is more analogous to Anza than to Bidge because the party directly
injured by the defendants' alleged conspiracy to defraud the government through a bidding
scheme was not the contractor, but the government, and the contractor's injuries were cast in
doubt by the fact that the defendant did not win all the contracts); Chaz Concrete Co. v.
Codell, No. 3:03-52-KKC, 2007 WL 1741934, at *11-12 (E.D. Ky. June 14, 2007), rev4 545
F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2008) (dismissing plaintiffs' claims that they were injured by the
defendants' misrepresentations to a state agency for failure either to plead reliance or provide
evidence of reliance as required under Anza); Leasure v. AA Advantage Forwarders, No.
5:03-CV-181-R, 2007 WL 925829, at *9-10 (WD. Ky. Mar. 23, 2007) (interpreting Anza as
"emphasizing that under RICO's proximate cause analysis set out in Holmes, a RICO plaintiff
may not recover for damages sustained by a third party" and consequently finding that the
"[p]laintiff cannot recover under RICO for any harms he may have indirectly sustained as a
result of the alleged direct injuries incurred by the United States Government"); Uni-Rty
Corp. v. Guandong Bldg., Inc., 464 E Supp. 2d 226, 231 (S.D.N.Y 2006) (finding plaintiffs
failed to allege proximate cause when their injury would have occurred regardless of
defendant's conduct); Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 447 E Supp. 2d 379, 387 (D.N.J. 2006)
(finding that when the plaintiff's asserted injury (underpayment of wages) was distinct from
the alleged RICO violation (harboring, transporting and encouraging illegal aliens) plaintiff
failed to show proximate cause); Corporate Healthcare Fin., Inc. v. BCI Holdings Co., 444 F
Supp. 2d 423, 429 (D. Md. 2006) ("[A] civil RICO complaint is vulnerable to a motion to
dismiss if it fails to allege ... an adequate causal nexus between [plaintiffs] injury and the
predicate acts of racketeering activity alleged."); Downstream Envtl., LLC v. Gulf Coast
Waste Disposal Auth., No. H-05-1865, 2006 WL 1875959, at *7 (S.D. Tex. July 5, 2006)
(finding that where the cause of plaintiff's asserted injury (competitor charging lower prices)
was distinct from the alleged RICO violations (competitor operating without a required
license), plaintiff could not meet the proximate-cause requirement).
68. 553 U.S. 639, 650-60 (2008).
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which it sells the liens.6' At the auctions, prospective purchasers do not
actually make cash bids for the liens, but instead bid an amount (stated
as a percentage penalty) that they are willing to take from the
delinquent taxpayer to clear the lien.7 ' The winning bidder is the
person offering the lowest penalty; he or she then has the right to
purchase the lien by paying the back taxes." If the property owner
does not redeem the property by paying off the lienholder within a
statutory period, then the lienholder may obtain a tax deed for the
property.72
Because property purchased for back taxes can sometimes be
resold at a significant profit, the auctions are fiercely competitive,
often with multiple bidders willing to accept the lowest possible
penalty-nothing (0%)." What happens, then, when multiple bidders
offer the minimum? The county's solution was to implement a
"rotation" system that-in theory-provided for a fair apportionment
of liens amongst 0% bidders.74 But avarice and gamesmanship
converged to skew the results: bidders would not only participate in
their own name, but they would also send agents as well, and thereby
receive a disproportionate amount of the liens. To stymie those
shenanigans, the county adopted a "Single, Simultaneous Bidder
Rule," which (1) required each "tax buying entity" to submit bids in its
own name and (2) prohibited it from using "agents, employees, or
related entities" to submit simultaneous bids." To give teeth to the
rule, the county required each auction participant to sign an affidavit
swearing that he or she was in compliance with the Rule."
The dispute arose because the defendants allegedly violated the
Rule, offered fraudulent affidavits, and thereby received a
disproportionate share of the liens at the expense of the plaintiffs and
other bidders.77 Based on these allegations, the district court dismissed
the suit, holding that plaintiffs' injuries were too remote." The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, but it
acknowledged a circuit split on the issue of whether "the direct victin
69. Id at 642.
70. Id.
71. Id
72. Id
73. Id.
74. Id at 643.
75. Id
76. Id.
77. Id at 643-44.
78. Id. at 645.
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may recover through RICO whether or not it is the direct recipient of
the false statements."" The Supreme Court granted certiorari"o to
resolve an issue left open by Anza. namely, "whether first-party
reliance is an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on mail
fraud."8'
The Court in Bridge first examined the problem from a structural
perspective, essentially setting out the grammar of a cognizable civil
RICO claim: (1) standing to bring a civil claim under § 1964(c);
(2) for violation of one of the substantive provisions of § 1962
(subsection "c" in this case); (3) through "racketeering activity," which
is defined in § 1961(1)(B) to include a host of so-called predicate acts
(here, mail fraud under § 134 1).8 Offered in plain English and tailored
for the case at hand, "[t]he upshot is that RICO provides a private right
of action for treble damages to any person injured in his business or
property by reason of the conduct of a qualifying enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of acts indictable as mail fraud." 3 According to the
Court, "[o]nce the relationship among these statutory provisions is
understood, respondents' theory of the case is straightforward," to wit:
They allege that petitioners devised a scheme to defraud when they
agreed to submit false attestations of compliance with the Single,
Simultaneous Bidder Rule to the county. In furtherance of this scheme,
petitioners used the mail on numerous occasions to send the requisite
notices to property owners. Each of these mailings was an "act which
is indictable" as mail fraud, and together they constituted a "pattern of
racketeering activity." By conducting the affairs of their enterprise
through this pattern of racketeering activity, petitioners violated
§ 1962(c). As a result, respondents lost the opportunity to acquire
valuable liens. Accordingly, respondents were injured in their business
or property by reason of petitioners' violation of § 1962(c), and RICO's
plain terms give them a private right of action for treble damages.
Against this uncluttered liability scheme, defendants argued that
(1) because mail fraud was the bottom brick in plaintiffs' RICO wall,
(2) the whole wall collapsed since plaintiffs could not show that they
reliedon anything fraudulent because the alleged misrepresentations-
defendants' affirmations of compliance with the Rule-were made to
79. Id at 646; Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co. v. Bridge, 477 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir.
2007).
80. See552 U.S. 1087 (2008)
81. Bidge, 553 U.S. at 646.
82. Id. at 647.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 647-48.
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the county, not plaintiffs." In defendants' view, although the county
may have relied on their misrepresentations, plaintiffs never received
the misrepresentations and, as a consequence, could not show
reliance." Thus, defendants argued, plaintiffs failed to state a claim
under RICO. The Court immediately focused on the underlying
premise of defendants' position and set out to show it false."
1. Reliance Under Bndge
If civil RICO has a reliance requirement, then it must flow from
one of two sources: the mail fraud statute or the civil standing
provision of § 1964(c)." The first candidate was easily dispatched
because the Court had recently and unequivocally held that "[u]sing
the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is
indictable as mail fraud, and hence a predicate act of racketeering
under RICO, even if no one relied on any misrepresentation."89 It is
thus beyond serious dispute that:
no showing of reliance is required to establish that a person has violated§ 1962(c) by conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity consisting of acts of mail fraud. If reliance is
required, then, it must be by virtue of § 1964(c), which provides the
right of action. But it is difficult to derive a first-party reliance
requirement from § 1964(c), which states simply that "[a]ny person
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962" may sue for treble damages.90
To hold otherwise, according to the Court, is to swim against the
strong textual current of § 1964(c), which extends, without
qualification, private rights to "[a]ny person injured" by a criminal
RICO violation.9 1 This "breadth of coverage" squares neither with an
implied reliance requirement nor the reality that a person can in fact be
injured by a misrepresentation of which she was unaware:
85. Id. at 648.
8 6. Id.
87. Id. ("If petitioners' proposed requirement of first-party reliance seems to come
out of nowhere, there is a reason: Nothing on the face of the relevant statutory provisions
imposes such a requirement.").
88. Id at 649.
89. Id. at 648-49 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1999) ("The
common-law requirement[] of 'justifiable reliance' . . . plainly ha[s] no place in the [mail,
wire, or bank] fraud statutes." (alterations in original))).
90. Id. at 649 (quoting 18 U.S.C § 196 4(c) (2006)).
91. Id
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This is a case in point. Accepting their allegations as true, respondents
clearly were injured by petitioners' scheme: As a result of petitioners'
fraud, respondents lost valuable liens they otherwise would have been
awarded. And this is true even though they did not rely on petitioners'
false attestations of compliance with the county's rules. Or, to take
another example, suppose an enterprise that wants to get rid of rival
businesses mails misrepresentations about them to their customers and
suppliers, but not to the rivals themselves. If the rival businesses lose
money as a result of the misrepresentations, it would certainly seem that
they were injured in their business "by reason of" a pattern of mail
fraud, even though they never received, and therefore never relied on,
the fraudulent mailings. Yet petitioners concede that, on their reading of
§ 1964(c), the rival businesses would have no cause of action under
RICO, even though they were the primary and intended victims of the
scheme to defraud.92
To combat this text-based position, defendants offered three common
law and policy-based arguments. First, defendants asserted that
"RICO should be read to incorporate a first-party reliance requirement
in fraud cases under the rule that Congress intends to incorporate the
well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses."" Defendants'
two-part reasoning was that because common law fraud requires
victim reliance, and because the Court had previously imported
common law constructs into the RICO framework in Beck v Prupis,
the same should be done in the present case.94 The flaw in this
argument, according to the Court, is that Beck is only superficially
analogous:
92. Id. at 649-50 (citation omitted). Justice Thomas's hypothetical is not far from
reality. In 1995, Proctor & Gamble sued Amway under various causes of action, including
RICO mail-fraud claims, for spreading rumors that the company and its president were active
Satan-worshippers. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 E3d 539, 542-43 (5th Cir.
2001). The Fifth Circuit relied on a "narrow exception" from an earlier case suggesting that
under RICO mail-fraud claims "defendants' competitors might recover for injuries to
competitive position" even though the competitor, in this case, Proctor & Gamble, did not
directly rely on the fraud. Id. at 565 (citing Summit Props., Inc. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.,
214 E3d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 2000), overruled by St. Germain v. Howard, 556 E3d 261, 263
(5th Cir. 2009)). The court ultimately found that Proctor & Gamble's RICO mail-fraud claim
was sufficient because, "if P & G's customers relied on the fraudulent rumor in making
decisions to boycott P&G products, this reliance suffices to show proximate causation." Id.
93. Bidge, 553 U.S. at 650 (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. at 650-62 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977) ("The
recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation may recover for common law fraud . .. if, but only
if ... he relies on the misrepresentation in acting or refraining from action." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 504 (2000) ("[W]hen Congress
established in RICO a civil cause of action for a person 'injured ... by reason of' a
'conspir[acy],' it meant to adopt these well-established common-law civil conspiracy
principles.")).
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The critical difference between Beck and this case is that in § 1962(d)
Congress used a term-"conspir[acy]"-that had a settled common-
law meaning, whereas Congress included no such term in § 1962(c).
Section 1962(c) does not use the term "fraud"; nor does the operative
language of § 1961(1)(B), which defines "racketeering activity" to
include "any act which is indictable under ... section 1341." And the
indictable act under § 1341 is not the fraudulent misrepresentation, but
rather the use of the mails with the purpose of executing or attempting
to execute a scheme to defraud. In short, the key term in § 1962(c)-
"racketeering activity"-is a defined term, and Congress defined the
predicate act not as fraud shnpliciter, but mail fraud-a statutory
offense unknown to the common law. In these circumstances, the
presumption that Congress intends to adopt the settled meaning of
common-law terms has little pull."
Second, defendants argued that even if first-party reliance is not
an element of a fraud-based criminal RICO claim, a civil plaintiff
"must show that it relied on the defendant's misrepresentations in order
to establish the requisite element of causation." In support of their
position, defendants pointed to certain common law principles,
especially as embodied in section 548A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, which provides, "A fraudulent misrepresentation is a legal
cause of a pecuniary loss resulting from action or inaction in reliance
upon it if, but only if, the loss might reasonably be expected to result
from the reliance.""
The Court deemed this argument "twice flawed." As a threshold
matter, the Court pointed back to its determination that mail fraud, not
common law fraud, was the predicate act at issue:
Having rejected petitioners' argument that reliance is an element of a
civil RICO claim based on mail fraud, we see no reason to let that
argument in through the back door by holding that the proximate-cause
analysis under RICO must precisely track the proximate-cause analysis
of a common-law fraud claim.99
95. Bndge, 553 U.S. at 653 (alteration in original). The Court also noted:
Beckrelied not only on the fact that the term "conspiracy" had a settled common-
law meaning, but also on the well-established common-law understanding of what
it means to be injured by a conspiracy for purposes of bringing a civil claim for
damages. No comparable understanding exists with respect to injury caused by an
enterprise conducting its affairs through a pattern of acts indictable as mail fraud.
Id. at 653 (citation omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id at 655 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id.
99. Id.
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Even more to the point, however, defendants' flat-footed position
that absent proof of victim reliance an injured plaintiff cannot recover
is simply wrong because "there is no general common-law principle
holding that a fraudulent misrepresentation can cause legal injury only
to those who rely on it."" The Restatement does not go so far; to the
contrary, it and much case law hold otherwise.'"' For example, "the
Restatement specifically recognizes 'a cause of action' in favor of the
injured party where the defendant 'defrauds another for the purpose of
causing pecuniary harm to a third person."
02
In sum, given the facts of the case, the Court concluded that its
view of the matter was in harmony with its previous causation
pronouncements and, moreover, that the plaintiffs were ideally situated
to enforce RICO's prohibitions:
Respondents' alleged injury-the loss of valuable liens-is the direct
result of petitioners' fraud. It was a foreseeable and natural
consequence of petitioners' scheme to obtain more liens for themselves
that other bidders would obtain fewer liens. And here, unlike in Holmes
and Anza, there are no independent factors that account for
respondents' injury, there is no risk of duplicative recoveries by
plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violation, and no
more immediate victim is better situated to sue.'03
In an important qualification, the Court went on to state, "Of
course, none of this is to say that a RICO plaintiff who alleges injury
'by reason of' a pattern of mail fraud can prevail without showing that
someone relied on the defendant's misrepresentations."" Thus, "[iun
most cases, the plaintiff will not be able to establish even but-for
causation if no one relied on the misrepresentation."'o5 As an
100. Idat656.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A (1977), upon which defendants'
argument relied, ironically enough, requires only that someone rely on a misrepresentation
and that injury be foreseeable. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 656-57 n.7 (citing cases upholding this
principle).
102. Bidge, 553 U.S. at 657 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435A cmt.
a (1965)).
103. Id. at 658.
104. Id
105. Id.; see also Brief for National Association of Shareholder and Consumer
Attorneys as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 553 U.S. 639 (2008) (No. 07-210),
2008 WL 782548, at *7 ("Reliance (or its absence) may in some situations establish (or not
establish) the proximate cause nexus between a violation of RICO and the injury to the
victim's business or property, but it is plainly not necessary in every situation. . . ." (emphasis
omitted) (citing Gordon, Rethidang Civil RICO, supm note 5)); Gordon, Rethmking Civil
RICO, supra note 5, at 329 ("In most cases, causation and reliance amount to the same
thing.").
2011]1 695
TULANELA WREVIEW [Vol. 85:677
affirmative matter of pleading and proof, then, "it may well be that a
RICO plaintiff alleging injury by reason of a pattern of mail fraud
must establish at least third-party reliance in order to prove
causation."'"
So, at bottom, reliance remains a useful concept in fraud-based
civil RICO claims. It is not an element of the claim,o' but it is a handy
way to test causal chains, particularly if reliance appears far down the
chain from the person claiming injury."' And the total absence of
reliance from a case surely means that there was no fraud at all.'"
In a final stab at § 1964's heart, defendants suggested that a first-
party reliance requirement is a practical way to halt the "'over-
federalization' of traditional state-law claims.""o In support of this
policy argument, they repeated the standard argument that such a
limitation is necessary "to prevent garden-variety disputes between
local competitors (such as this case) from being converted into federal
racketeering actions.""' None of this fell on fertile soil: "Whatever the
merits of petitioners' arguments as a policy matter, we are not at liberty
106. Bndge, 553 U.S. at 659.
107. See, eg., Biggs v. Eaglewood Mortg., LLC, 353 F. App'x 864, 866-67 (4th Cir.
2009) (finding that Bndge "eliminates the requirement that a plaintiff prove reliance in order
to prove a violation of RICO predicated on mail fraud"); Brown v Cassens Transp. Co., 546
E3d 347, 357 (6th Cir. 2008) ("After Bndge, plaintiffs need not plead or prove that they relied
on defendants' alleged misrepresentations in order to establish the elements of their civil
RICO claim based on mail or wire fraud."); Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mack, 290 F App'x 832,
832-33, 835-36 (6th Cir. 2008) (remanding plaintiff's RICO claims for further inquiry into
proximate cause in accordance with Bndge's removal of the requirement of third-party
reliance).
108. See, eg., Chaz Concrete Co. v. Codell, No. 3:03-52-KKC, 2010 WL 1227750, at
*14 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 2010) (dismissing plaintiffs' third-party RICO claims because, even
though Bidge does not require plaintiffs to "argue their injuries were caused by their reliance
on the Defendants' false statements, if the Plaintiffs do make such an argument, [as they did,]
then they must submit evidence of what those statements were and of their falsity [as they
failed to do]"). Compare Ironworkers Local Union No. 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 585 F
Supp. 2d 1339, 1343-45 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (finding that even though plaintiffs' alleged third-
party reliance by physicians who prescribed a drug marketed and promoted to them by the
manufacturer, their claims failed under the proximate causation requirement), with Brown,
546 F3d at 351, 357 (finding that "plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded a pattern of
racketeering activity given that reliance is not an element of a civil RICO fraud claim"), and
Johnson v. KB Home, No. CV-09-00972-PHX-FJM, 2010 WL 1268144, at *6 (D. Ariz. Mar.
30, 2010) ("Because Bidge does not require plaintiffs to plead reliance and [defendant] does
not offer a cogent argument for why they must otherwise do so to show causation under the
circumstances of this case, we deny [defendant's] motion to dismiss with respect to
causation.").
109. See Bidge, 553 U.S. at 657-61; see also Ironworkes, 585 F Supp. 2d at 1343
(recognizing that "the complete absence of reliance may prevent the plaintiff from
establishing proximate cause" (quoting Bidge, 553 U.S. at 658-59)).
110. Bidge, 553 U.S. at 659.
111. Id. at 660 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to rewrite RICO to reflect their-or our-views of good policy."'1 2
And if the fact that "RICO's text provides no basis for imposing a first-
party reliance requirement ... leads to the undue proliferation of
RICO suits, the 'correction must lie with Congress."'H3
2. (Over)Applying Reliance Under Bidge
If Anza led to overcorrections in one direction, then Bndge did so
in the other. For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit fairly quickly held that "to the extent that our prior cases
are in conflict with Bndge, they are overruled.""' That statement, in
isolation, is innocuous and legally demanded. But the court made this
proclamation in the context of a case in which the district court had
supposedly dismissed the complaint based on "Fifth Circuit precedent
that is no longer good law.""' The precedent specifically mentioned is
Summit Properties Inc. v Hoechst Celanese Corp."' Summit was a
products liability case in which the plaintiffs alleged that polybutylene
plumbing systems installed on their properties were defective."' Their
RICO fraud claim turned on the allegation that the defendants made
fraudulent statements concerning suitability, quality, and reliability in
connection with the marketing of these systems."' The property-owner
plaintiffs did not receive or rely on the alleged misrepresentations."'
The court noted that most circuits at the time required "a showing of
detrimental reliance by the plaintiff, which is consistent with Holmes'
admonition that federal courts employ traditional notions of proximate
cause when assessing the nexus between a plaintiff's injuries and the
underlying RICO violation."'20 And, as the court went on to explain,
that makes especially good sense in the context of products liability
claims:
The rationale for requiring reliance in cases such as this one becomes
clear in the light cast by the distinction between causation as an element
of a claim for fraud and producing cause as an element of a claim for
products liability. The linkage between design defect and injury is
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting Sedima, S.PR.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,499 (1985)).
114. St. Germain v. Howard, 556 E3d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 2009).
115. Id
116. 214 E3d 556 (5th Cir. 2000).
117. Id. at 558.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Id at 560 (footnote omitted).
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between the defect and the injury. With a claim for fraud, however, the
linkage is between the defendants' hfaudand the injury.2'
This is so because "[a]s a product travels in the stream of commerce,
inherent defects are carried with it, but fraudulent statements are
not." 22  Consequently, "[t]he causal connection between a
misrepresentation and a subsequent harm ... vanishes once the
product travels beyond the entity who actually relied on the
representation when making the purchasing decision." 23 But the court
was not making this assessment solely in terms of first-party reliance.
Rather, it was merely registering that reliance is one way of showing
causation, not the only way. That is, the plaintiff must show that it "has
either been the target of a fraud or has relied upon the fraudulent
conduct of the defendants."'24 The court thus allowed that "[i]n the
current case, for example, the defendants' competitors might recover
for injuries to competitive position," even though they had not relied
on the fraud.2
It is not clear that this reasoning should not survive Bridge In
fact, one could argue that the Supreme Court-indirectly, at least-
endorsed Sunmmit's holding,126 given that it appeared to approve of the
reasoning of Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v Reliance National
Indemnity Insurance Co., whose own reasoning is based on Sumnit 27
In any event, to the extent that Bridge was read to roll back the central
holding of Anza, the Supreme Court's most recent foray into the
causation thicket should disabuse us of that notion.
D Revisithng Causation and Third-Party Rehance: Hemi
In Hemi Group, LLC v City of New York, the Court was called
upon to revisit the issue of causation in the context of
misrepresentations made to someone other than the plaintiff.128 The
Court succinctly stated the facts as follows:
121. Id. (footnote omitted).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 561 (emphasis added).
125. Id.
126. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 646 (2008)
(recognizing that Sandwich Chefacknowledged "'a narrow exception to the requirement that
the plaintiff prove direct reliance on the defendant's fraudulent predicate act ... when the
plaintiff can demonstrate injury as a direct and contemporaneous result of a fraud committed
against a third party"' (alteration in original) (quoting Sandwich Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance
Nat'l Indem. Ins. Co., 319 E3d 205, 223 (5th Cir. 2003))).
127. 319F.3dat218-25.
128. 130S.Ct.983(2010).
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The City of New York taxes the possession of cigarettes. Hemi
Group, based in New Mexico, sells cigarettes online to residents of the
City. Neither state nor city law requires Hemi to charge, collect, or
remit the tax, and the purchasers seldom pay it on their own. Federal
law, however, requires out-of-state vendors such as Hemi to submit
customer information to the States into which they ship the cigarettes.
Against that backdrop, the City filed this lawsuit under [RICO],
alleging that Hemi failed to file the required customer information with
the State. That failure, the City argues, constitutes mail and wire fraud,
which caused it to lose tens of millions of dollars in unrecovered
cigarette taxes.'29
To state the facts in this way is to lay out a long causal chain. To
wit: Hemi sold cigarettes to residents of New York City and did not
fulfill its legal obligation to submit purchasers' names to the State.
Without the reports, the State could not fulfill its contractual obligation
to pass along the names to the City and without the names from the
State, the City could not determine which customers had not paid
taxes. And without that information, the City could not pursue the
nonpaying customers; therefore, the City was injured in the amount of
the unpaid taxes.'
Thus stated, the theory of causation fits comfortably into the
Anza framework, especially given that "the conduct directly
responsible for the City's harm was the customers' failure to pay their
taxes" and that "the conduct constituting the alleged fraud was Hemi's
failure to file Jenkins Act reports.""' In other words, as in Anza, there
was a gap between the direct harm-producing conduct and fraud-
producing conduct.'32 Even more troubling for the Court, "the City's
theory of liability rests not just on separate actions, but separate actions
carried out by separate parties."" The Court thus declined to "extend
RICO liability to situations where the defendant's fraud on the third
party (the State) has made it easier for a fourth party (the taxpayer) to
129. Id. at 986.
130. Seeid.
131. Id. at 990. The Jenkins Act "requires out-of-state cigarette sellers to register and
to file a report with state tobacco tax administrators listing the name, address, and quantity of
cigarettes purchased by state residents." Id. at 987 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 375-378, repealed by
Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-154, 124 Stat. 1087 (2010)).
132. Id at 990. In his dissent, Justice Breyer opined that Hemi is not like Anza
because "the kind ofharm that the plaintiff alleged [in Anza] is not the kind ofharm that the
tax statutes [in Henn] primarily seek to prevent." Id at 999-1000. Rather, the plaintiffs in
Hemi "alleged a kind of harm (competitive injury) that tax violations do not ordinarily cause
and which ordinarily flows from the regular operation of a competitive marketplace." Id at
1000.
133. Id at 990.
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cause harm to the plaintiff (the City)."'34 This is particularly so because
harm accrues only if the fourth-party taxpayers made the predicate
decision not to pay the taxes that they had a legal obligation to pay.'
And even if that harm was foreseeable, that is not enough: proximate
cause depends on "directness" not "foreseeability." 6
The City offered a number of rebuttal points, one of which is
likely to have larger consequences. Specifically, the City argued that
the violation it claimed was not merely that Hemi did not file Jenkins
Act reports; rather, Hemi had concocted a "systematic scheme to
defraud the City of tax revenue."' But, according to the Court, to
embrace such a theory would be to reduce its precedents "to a mere
pleading rule."'38 For example, in Anza, the plaintiff could not
"circumvent the proximate-cause requirement simply by claiming that
the defendant's aim was to increase market share at a competitor's
expense."'39 Even more to the point, the Court has more than once held
that "the compensable injury flowing from a [RICO] violation ...
'necessarily is the harm caused by [the] predicate acts.""40 But the
only fraudulent conduct that the City alleged was a Jenkins Act
violation. Thus the City had to show "that Hemi's failure to file the
Jenkins Act reports with the State led directly to its injuries," which it
could not do.'4' Given this strict articulation of the causation rule, it
remains to be seen whether many (or any) "scheme to defraud" claims
will survive motions to dismiss, absent pleading that a
misrepresentation is the direct cause of injury.'42
134. Id. at 985.
135. Id. at 990. In its arguments to the Court, the City changed course and alleged that
Hemi made misrepresentations to City residents that encouraged them not to pay taxes. Id at
993. The Court declined to consider these allegations because the City had earlier disavowed
them. Id at 994.
136. Id. at 991.
137. Id.
138. Id
139. Id. (citing Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 460 (2006)).
140. Id (citing Anza, 547 U.S. at 457 (alterations in original)).
141. Id at 992.
142. Compare Chaz Concrete Co. v. Codell, No. 3:03-52-KKC, 2010 WL 1227750, at
*10-11 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 2010) ("[T]he Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of showing that
the Defendants' fraud caused the Plaintiffs' injuries by simply showing that 'the concept of
the injury was well known to the defendants' and, thus, foreseeable .... Instead, the Plaintiffs
must produce evidence of a direct relationship between their injuries and the fraud."), with
Johnson v. KB Home, No. CV-09-00972-PHX-FJM, 2010 WL 1268144, at *6 (D. Ariz. Mar.
30, 2010) (reversing dismissal of plaintiffs complaint because even though plaintiffs' did not
plead reliance, they sufficiently pleaded that defendants' actions were "a direct cause of their
injuries and a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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The City also tried to wrap itself in Bidge.1" But the Court again
noted that the theory of causation there was 'straightforward':
Because of the zero-sum nature of the auction, and because the county
awarded bids on a rotational basis, each time a fraud-induced bid was
awarded, a particular legitimate bidder was necessarily passed over."'"
Even more important, the losing bidders "'were the only parties
injured by petitioners' misrepresentations.' The county was not; it
received the same revenue regardless of which bidder prevailed."'45 In
contrast, the Court opined, the City's theory was anything but
"straightforward," given that "[m]ultiple steps ... separate the alleged
fraud from the asserted injury."' And unlike Bidge, where there were
"'no independent factors that account[ed] for [the plaintiff's] injury,'
here there certainly were: The City's theory of liability rests on the
independent actions of third and even fourth parties."'47 Again, this
line of argument is bound to impact cases in which plaintiffs-as a
theory of causation-substitute allegations of a "scheme to defraud"
directed at the plaintiffs for predicate acts that are actually felt
elsewhere.'48
In sum, Hemi may fairly be read to hold that civil RICO
causation cannot be premised on a theory depending on an allegation
that fraud perpetrated on a third party prevented that party from taking
actions that could have prevented the plaintiff's injury.
IV. RELAXING THE RICO "ENTERPRISE" ELEMENT UNDER BOYLE
Boyle presents a version of the familiar aphorism that "hard cases
make bad law," something like: Cases in weird procedural postures
lead to decisions that are hard to apply to other situations.149 The case
arrived at the Supreme Court framed as a disagreement over the
adequacy of a jury instruction given in a criminal RICO trial.' The
143. Henn, 130 S. Ct. at 992.
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 658 (2008)
(citation omitted)).
146. Id.
147. Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
148. Eg., Chaz Concrete Co. v. Codell, No. 3:03-52-KKC, 2010 WL 1227750, at *10-
11 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 2010) (describing plaintiff's claims of reliance and injury from
defendants' misrepresentations to a state agency allowing defendants' to obtain federally
funded transportation projects).
149. This phrase originates from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. N. Sec. Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The full quotation actually
reads: "Great cases like hard cases make bad law." Id.
150. Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2241-42 (2009).
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instruction at issue purported to set forth the standards for establishing
the "enterprise" element of a RICO claim through an "association-in-
fact.""' For purposes of deciding the case, the Court stated the
question presented as "whether an association-in-fact enterprise ...
must have an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern
of racketeering activity in which it engages."'52 For an answer, the
Court offered the oracular statement that "such an enterprise must have
a 'structure' but that an instruction framed in this precise language is
not necessary."' What is necessary remains to be seen, but the Court's
reasoning leading up to the holding perhaps sheds some light.
But first, some general background will help. RICO's principal
target is traditional organized crime.'54 And although its reach is much
broader, we can see that it was drafted with the sorts of things that old
school organized criminals (e.g., the Mafia) did: infiltrating unions
and their pension funds, investing in and skimming profits from
casinos, muscling in on trash collection companies, and actually
151. Id at 2242. The jury instruction read:
The term "enterprise" as used in these instructions may also include a group
of people associated in fact, even though this association is not recognized as a
legal entity. Indeed, an enterprise need not have a name. Thus, an enterprise need
not be a form[al] business entity such as a corporation, but may be merely an
informal association of individuals. A group or association of people can be an
"enterprise" if, among other requirements, these individuals "associate" together
for a purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. Common sense suggests that the
existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes more readily proven by what it
does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure.
Moreover, you may find an enterprise where an association of individuals,
without structuralhierarchy, forms solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern
of racketeering acts. Such an association of persons may be established by
evidence showing an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and ... by
evidence that the people making up the association functioned as a continuing unit.
Therefore, in order to establish the existence of such an enterprise, the government
must prove that: (I) There is an ongoing organization with some sort of
framework, formal or informal, for carrying out its objectives; and (2) the various
members and associates of the association function as a continuing unit to achieve
a common purpose.
Regarding "organization," it is not necessary that the enterprise have any
particular or formal structure, but it must have sufficient organization that its
members functioned and operated in a coordinated manner in order to carry out the
alleged common purpose or purposes of the enterprise.
Id at 2242 n.1.
152. Id. at 2241 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id
154. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-
23 (1970) ("It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States . . . ."); see also Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 496 (2000) (discussing the
purpose of RICO).
702
2011] RICO AND THE SUPREME COURT 703
committing crimes like distributing drugs or running prostitution
rings.'5 Consequently, the drafters built the statute around the concept
of an "enterprise," which could be a traditional corporation or union,
or a criminal organization itself.' To capture the latter concept, the
statute provides for an "association-in-fact" enterprise, which could
mean something like an ordinary "conspiracy," or something more
complicated like the Mafia.'' Most lower courts thought that it meant
the latter and developed standards for identifying true "associations"-
i.e., gangs that shared at least something of the Mafia's structure of
dons, capos, wiseguys, etc.' Accordingly, many courts held that an
association-in-fact enterprise must:
* Have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of
racketeering;
* Be an ongoing organization;
* Function as a continuing unit as shown by a hierarchical or
consensual decision making structure.19
It is against this backdrop that Boyle must be understood.
A. The Court Analysisin Boyle
Boyle himself participated in a series of bank thefts engineered
by a core group, along with others recruited for particular jobs. The
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006) (defining "racketeering activity" to include "any
act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion,
dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance" as well as many other
activities); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. at 923
("[M]oney obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the
theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other
dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation [is] used to infiltrate and corrupt
legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic process
156. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (.'[E]nterprise' includes any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity. . . ."); id. § 1962 (detailing prohibited activities).
157. Id. § 1961(4) ("[E]nterprise includes ... any union or group of individuals
associatedn fact although not a legal entity." (emphasis added)).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Irizarry, 341 F3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that
an enterprise requires "an ongoing organization with some sort of framework" that must "be
separate and apart from the pattern of activity"); United States v. Kragness, 830 E2d 842, 855
(8th Cir. 1987) (finding that an enterprise requires "some continuity of structure and of
personnel" and "an ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a
pattern of racketeering activity"). But see, e.g., United States v. Goldin Indus., Inc., 219 E3d
1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that an enterprise is "an association of individual
entities, however loose or informal, that furnishes a vehicle for the commission of two or
more predicate crimes").
159. Crowe v. Henry, 43 E3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Landry v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n Int'l AFL-CIO, 901 E2d 404, 433 (5th Cir. 1990).
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group was only "loosely and informally" organized, and had no
obvious leader or hierarchy.6 Boyle was indicted for, among other
things, two RICO violations: illegally participating in the conduct of
an enterprise under § 1962(c) and conspiring to do so under
§ 1962(d). At trial, Boyle objected to the court's "enterprise"
instruction, and requested that the jury be told that "the Government
was required to prove that the enterprise had an ongoing organization,
a core membership that functioned as a continuing unit, and an
ascertainable structural hierarchy distinct from the charged predicate
acts.""' The district court declined that invitation, and Boyle was
convicted of the RICO violations.6 1
The Court first approached the "enterprise" question textually,
noting that the statutory definition includes both traditional business
organizations, as well as "any ... group of individuals associated in
fact," with "[t]he term 'any' ensur[ing] that the definition has a wide
reach."'" The Court next turned to its seminal enterprise case, United
States v Turkette,6 1 in which it held that "'an enterprise includes any
union or group of individuals associated in fact,"' that RICO extends
to "'a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of
engaging in a course of conduct,"' and that a RICO enterprise "'is
proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal,
and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing
unit.'l66
The Court opined that the question before it, namely, "whether an
association-in-fact enterprise must have an ascertainable structure
beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it
engages,"6 6 required three separate inquiries:
* First, must an association-in-fact enterprise have a "structure"?
* Second, must the structure be "ascertainable"?
* Third, must the "structure" go "beyond that inherent in the pattern of
racketeering activity" in which its members engage?66
The Court agreed that an association-in-fact must have a
structure.' But to define that structure, the Court simply turned to an
160. Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2241 (2009).
161. Id. at 2241-42.
162. Id. at 2242 (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2243 (emphasis added).
165. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
166. Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2243 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580, 583).
167. Id. at 2240 (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. Id.
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ordinary dictionary and picked a generic definition: "In the sense
relevant here, the term 'structure' means '[t]he way in which parts are
arranged or put together to form a whole' and '[t]he interrelation or
arrangement of parts in a complex entity.""" Against this standard, an
association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three features: "a
purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and
longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise's
purpose."'7
The Court made relatively short work of the "ascertainable"
issue, given the criminal posture of the case: "Whenever a jury is told
that it must find the existence of an element beyond a reasonable
doubt, that element must be 'ascertainable' or else the jury could not
find that it was proved." 72
The greatest repercussions of the case no doubt will be felt in the
"[b]eyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity" issue."'
The Court suggested:
This phrase may be interpreted in [at] least two different ways, and its
correctness depends on the particular sense in which the phrase is used.
If the phrase is interpreted to mean that the existence of an enterprise is
a separate element that must be proved, it is of course correct.
On the other hand, if the phrase is used to mean that the existence of
an enterprise may never be inferred from the evidence showing that
persons associated with the enterprise engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity, it is incorrect.'74
With one stroke, the Court eviscerated the holdings of scores of
cases in which lower courts had held that there must be a sharp
distinction between the alleged associational enterprise and the
predicate acts.' Among other things, the Court may have undermined
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2244 (alterations in original) (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
1718 (4th ed. 2000)).
171. Id.
172. Id
173. Id. at 2245.
174. Id.
175. E.g., Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 804-05 (7th
Cir. 2008) (holding that plaintiffs failed to allege an enterprise where no structure was
identified in the complaint because "[w]ithout a requirement of structure, 'enterprise'
collapses to 'conspiracy'); Walker v. Jackson Pub. Sch., 42 E App'x 735, 737-38 (6th Cir.
2002) (affirming district court's dismissal because there was no evidence of chain of
command or hierarchy); VanDenBroeck v. CommonPoint Mortg. Co., 210 F.3d 696, 699 (6th
Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S.
639 (2008) (stating that plaintiff must show formal or informal association as part of a
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many cases holding that a mere "conspiracy" is not the same as an
association-in-fact enterprise."' Nonetheless, there are still good
reasons, even within Boyle, to believe that an ordinary civil conspiracy
should not qualify for treatment as an enterprise."' After all, Boyle ran
a gang of bank robbers. This fits comfortably within even a lay view
of a criminal enterprise. But that is not what one typically sees in a
civil RICO case."' There, more often than not, the alleged association-
in-fact is a group of corporations (or corporations and individuals)-
not a "gang.""' We must also remember that the Boyle Court plainly
found that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof assured
that true criminal enterprises would be sieved from nonenterprises.'"
B. Figwnlg Out What To Do with Boyle
In the wake of Boyle, there are a number of evaluative tools that
can serve as surrogates for the criminal law's heightened proof
standards when examining alleged enterprises in the civil context. In
undertaking such an analysis, it bears repeating that the type of
continuing unit separate and apart from the commission of racketeering activity); Stephens,
Inc. v. Geldermann, Inc., 962 E2d 808, 815-16 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that plaintiff "failed to
allege an enterprise distinct from the alleged pattern of racketeering activity" because "[t]he
only common factor that linked all these parties together and defined them as a distinct group
was their direct or indirect participation in [the defendant's] scheme to defraud [the
plaintiff]"); Ocean Energy 1l, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 E2d 740, 748 (5th Cir.
1989) ("An enterprise must be an entity separate and apart from the pattern in which it
engages." (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 E3d
541, 550-51 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the circuit split and finding that an associated-in-fact
enterprise "does not require any particular organizational structure, separate or otherwise").
176. See Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2246 ("Finally, while in practice the elements of a
violation of §§ 1962(c) and (d) are similar, this overlap would persist even if petitioner's
conception of an association-in-fact enterprise were accepted."); Bachman v. Bear, Stearns &
Co., 178 E3d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that a mere conspiracy to commit racketeering
is not sufficient to establish an association-in-fact enterprise, rather some formal or informal
organizational structure apart from the alleged conspiracy to defraud is required).
177. See, e.g., Bachman, 178 E3d at 932 ("That is a conspiracy, but it is not an
enterprise unless every conspiracy is also an enterprise for RICO purposes, which the case
law denies."); see also Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2246 ("Section 1962(c) demands much more [than
proof of an ordinary conspiracy]: the creation of an 'enterprise'-a group with a common
purpose and course of conduct-and the actual commission of a pattern of predicate
offenses.").
178. See sources cited supra note 11.
179. Eg., Bingham v. Zolt, 683 F Supp. 965, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that
corporations and law firms may be RICO enterprises); Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen,
Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F Supp. 1362, 1364 (D. Conn. 1987) (describing group of
corporations, organizations, and other individuals promoting fraudulent securities); In re Gas
Reclamation, Inc. Sec. Litig., 659 E Supp. 493, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (describing a group of
corporations and individuals packing and selling gas reclamation units to the public).
180. Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2244.
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association-in-fact proven in Boyle is unlike that usually alleged in
civil litigation.'"' The differences between a Boyle-like association and
a civil-RICO association are often striking, and plenty of well-
reasoned case law is available to show why many alleged civil
associations should not be sustainable, even after Boyle.8 2  A few
possible ways of looking at these associations post-Boyle are worth
exploring.
1. Redefining Pleading Standards Under Twombly
In BellAtlantic Corp. v Twombly, the Supreme Court abrogated
its statement in Conley v Gibson'83 that "a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief."'84 To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
after Twombly, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face."'
2. Cementing Twombly: Iqbal
In Ashcroft v Iqbal, the Supreme Court elaborated on the
pleading standards discussed in Twombly.'" The Court set out a
procedure for evaluating whether a complaint should be dismissed:
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
181. Specifically, Boyle involved a core group of bank robbers and other sporadic
participants who targeted bank night-deposit boxes in several states over a ten-year period.
Id. at 2241. The participants met and planned the act beforehand, but apparently had no
leader or hierarchy and did not formulate any master plan. Id
182. See, eg., Rao v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 589 F.3d 389, 399-400 (7th Cir. 2009)
(affirming dismissal of § 1964(d) claim that contained "boilerplate allegations" and finding
no association-in-fact enterprise for lack of a showing a common purpose when different
actors were involved in each event); Kaye v. D'Amato, 357 F. App'x 706, 715 (7th Cir. 2009)
(dismissing enterprise existing of city planning commission and other redevelopment
authorities for lack of continuity); see also Herv6 Gouraige, Defing Civil Rico "Enterpnse"
After Boyle High Court Has Given Defense Counsel New Materin, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 8, 2009,
at S8.
183. 355 U.S. 41,45-46 (1957).
184. 550 U.S. 544, 562-63 (2007) (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46) ("[Conleys]
'no set of facts' language ... is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted
pleading standard. . . .").
185. Id at 570; see also Elsensohn v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office, 530 F.3d
368, 372 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
186. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'
This procedure requires a court to engage in a two-step analysis.
First, a court should identify which statements in the complaint are
factual allegations and which are legal conclusions.' 8 "Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice."' Second, a court must assume
the truth of all factual allegations, and determine whether those factual
allegations allege a plausible claim.'
With respect to the "plausibility" standard described in Twombly,
Iqbal explained, "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."'
The Iqbal Court noted, "The plausibility standard is not akin to a
'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully."'9 Perhaps the most important
consequence here is that "[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief."'"93
Stated differently, if a plaintiff fails to state a plausible theory of
recovery, then-especially in a complicated case-he will not be
allowed to engage the expensive machinery of litigation (i.e.,
discovery).
C What This Means for Civi RICO Clains
As I have already discussed, the concept of "enterprise" is the
sine qua non of any RICO claim, and the characteristic that
187. Id. at 1950.
188. Seeid.
189. Id. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The IqbalCourt further explained:
"Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading
regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions." Id. at 1950.
190. Id. at 1949 ("Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not
'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief."' (citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2))).
191. Id. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
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distinguishes a RICO claim from an ordinary tort claim.94
Consequently, a failure to allege an enterprise disables a claim under
any RICO theory.' Not surprisingly, courts routinely apply the
rigorous Twomblyl Iqbalpleading standards to RICO generally, and to
the enterprise element specifically.'
Even though Boyle relaxed the standard for proving an
association-in-fact enterprise, such an enterprise must still be
established as a separate RICO element andmust meet two criteria:
* It must be "an ongoing organization with some sort of framework,
formal or informal, for carrying out its objectives"; and
* "[T]he various members and associates of the association function[]
as a continuing unit to achieve a common purpose."'
194. See Bonner v. Henderson, 147 F.3d 457, 459 (5th Cir. 1998) ("By the very
language of the statute, the existence of an enterprise is an essential element of a RICO
claim."); Chang v. Chen, 80 E3d 1293, 1298-99 (9th Cir. 1996), overrled by Odom v.
Microsoft Corp., 486 E3d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that because the focus of RICO is
on "organized" crime, an "organizational nexus" must be found at the heart of a scheme
actionable under RICO); see also Gordon, Cres That Count Twice, supra note 5; discussion
supra Part IVA.
195. E.g., Brunig v. Clark, 560 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 2009) ("In order to state a claim
under RICO, a plaintiff must allege, among other elements, the existence of an enterprise.");
In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733, 741 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Thus, RICO claims under all four
subsections necessitate .. . an enterpise." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Reynolds v. E.
Dyer Dev. Co., 882 E2d 1249, 1251 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[I]t is essential to plead precisely in a
RICO case the enterprise alleged and the RICO section allegedly violated.").
196. E.g., Smartix Int'l Corp. v. MasterCard Int'l LLC, 355 E App'x 464, 466 (2d Cir.
2009) ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead [the required
elements for a § 1962(c) violation] to meet the standards set forth in Twombly and Iqbal");
Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 09-11529, 2010 WL 931864, at *22-25
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2010) ("Although Plaintiffs allege a number of different possible
enterprises, they have not arguably alleged one plausible enterprise."); see also Gross v.
Waywell, 628 E Supp. 2d 475, 494-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Plaintiffs' reliance on 'mail and/or
wire fraud' as the predicate offenses, by operation of Twomblys plausibility test and the
particularity requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) ... demands greater
specificity in the pleadings. Such particularity would require more details regarding the
alleged predicate acts in which each particular defendant was directly or indirectly involved
or had responsibility, as well as information concerning where, when and by which defendant
any representations involved in the alleged fraudulent scheme constituting deception of
Plaintiffs were communicated by use of the mail and/or wires, and how such statements
actually deceived Plaintiffs."). The court in Gross also analyzed 145 reported decisions of
civil RICO claims from 2004 to 2007 and found that of the 36 cases resolved on the merits,
30 were dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), three by the court sua sponte, and three under Rule
56; all decisions appealed to the Second Circuit were affirmed. 628 F. Supp. 2d at 480.
197. Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2242 (2009) (quoting the district court's
jury instructions it affirmed); Kaye v. D'Amato, 357 E App'x 706, 711 (7th Cir. 2009)
(quoting these elements from Boyle); see also McNulty v. Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc., No. 08-
CV-13178, 2009 WL 2168231, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2009) ("While [Boyle] does not
represent a watershed change in controlling law, it does constitute a [sic] important
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Thus a complaint that does no more than list a number of individuals
and entities and slap the labels "association-in-fact" and "enterprise"
on them should fail as a matter of pleading because "[t]his is a
conclusory statement, a recitation of the elements masquerading as
facts. It does not make it any more or less probable that the listed
parties have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of
racketeering, are an ongoing organization, and function as a continuing
unit .... .198
Boyle also leaves intact the rule that § 1962(c)-which, again, is
the most commonly alleged RICO violation-imposes an obligation to
plead a plausible distinction between the "person" (the defendants) and
the "enterprise."l 99 That is, "to state a violation of subsection (c), the
alleged RICO person and the alleged RICO enterprise must be
distinct."200 Further, a corporation cannot ordinarily be named as a
defendant and as part of an association-in-fact enterprise.20 In
practice, this prevents a plaintiff from alleging a complete identity
between the alleged "conspirators" and the enterprise and between the
named defendants and the enterprise202 because it contravenes the
clarification of the standards for establishing a RICO enterprise originally set forth in
[Turkette].").
198. Clark, 560 F3d at 297; see also Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Ill.,
520 E3d 797, 804 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying Twombly to RICO claim and finding that
"[n]owhere in the complaint does one find anything to indicate a structure of any kind");
Duran v. Equifirst Corp., No. 2:09-cv-03856, 2010 WL 936199, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Mar. 12,
2010) (dismissing plaintiffs' state-RICO claim because "[e]ach alleged predicate act is
generally alleged to have been committed by every Defendant in this action, as opposed to
alleging which particular Defendant ... committed which particular predicate act;' and "[i]t
is not explained how [the defendant] is tied to any of the predicate acts").
199. Eg., Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161 (2001) ("[T]o
establish liability under § 1962(c) one must allege and prove the existence of two distinct
entities: (1) a 'person'; and (2) an 'enterprise' that is not simply the same 'person' referred to
by a different name."); see also ClatA 560 F.3d at 297 (asserting an association of defendants
is insufficient under Twombly).
200. Andrews v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, Inc., 176 F Supp. 2d 673, 687 (W.D. Tex. 2001)
("Quite simply, a RICO person cannot employ or associate with itself.").
201. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 E3d 425, 447 (5th Cir. 2000);
Andrews, 176 F Supp. 2d at 687. Although it is a minority position, some cases hold that a
corporation cannot be part of an association-in-fact at all. See, eg., Lockheed Martin Corp.
v. Boeing Co., 357 E Supp. 2d 1350, 1364-65 (M.D. Fla. 2005). The reasoning here is that
"individual" in RICO's definition of "enterprise" refers only to living persons.
202. Vaguely asserting that only "some" of the defendants form the enterprise is no
cure. This is the sort of "open-ended" description of the enterprise that courts routinely reject
on vagueness grounds. Eg,, Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F3d 640, 645 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that plaintiffs complaint, which describes the enterprise as consisting of three
defendants plus "at least" four other entities, was too vague to satisfy the notice requirement).
In any event, merely removing some defendants from the alleged enterprise does not solve a
710
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mandatory person/enterprise distinction. 203  Accordingly, a failure to
distinguish the RICO persons from the RICO enterprise should-
despite Boyle-continue to vitiate a plaintiff's RICO claim alleged
under § 1962(c).2 0
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Crichton v Golden Rule
Insurance Co. is particularly illustrative of the problems inherent in
open-ended or otherwise casually stated associational enterprise
allegations.205 In Golden Rule, the plaintiff purchased insurance under
a "master policy" offered to members of a consumer and traveler
organization (the "Federation").206 He later sued the insurer, Golden
Rule, on behalf of a nationwide class. The gist of his claims, which
included a RICO claim, was that Golden Rule did not adequately
disclose the cost of his premiums.20 ' In connection with his RICO
claim, the plaintiff alleged, alternatively, that Golden Rule and the
plaintiff's "identity" problem. See Williamson, 224 E3d at 447; Andrews, 176 E Supp. 2d at
687.
203. Andrews, 176 E Supp. 2d at 687 (holding that because defendant-charitable
corporations and individuals overlapped with alleged members of association-in-fact,
enterprise element failed); see also Williamson, 224 E3d at 447 n.16 ("To get around having
a corporation named as both a RICO defendant and a RICO enterprise, many plaintiffs have
charged the corporation as being part of an association-in-fact enterprise and also as a RICO
defendant. Courts have roundly criticized this formulation."); Bradley v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 527 E Supp. 2d 625, 652 (S.D. Tex. 2007) ("Having failed to allege an extemal
enterprise, the . . . Plaintiffs have necessarily asserted that Defendants are 'employed by or
associated with' themselves. Such identity of elements is impermissible for a RICO claim
under § 1962(c).").
204. See FMC Int'l A.G. v. ABB Lummus Global, Inc., No. H-04-3896, 2006 WL
213948, at *9 (S.D. Tex Jan. 25, 2006) ("FMC's own allegations defeat the distinctiveness
requirement under § 1962(c). FMC alleges in its Original Federal Complaint that ABB and
Heerema are RICO persons, and that the JV, which is a joint venture between ABB and
Heerema, is a RICO enterprise. FMC then alleges that ABB and Heerema 'have acted as
RICO enterprises'. Because FMC's allegations demonstrate that there is no distinction
between the RICO persons and the purported RICO enterprise(s), FMC has not stated a
RICO viable claim under § 1962(c)."). The only exception to the nonidentity rule is that a
living person can be a defendant and part of an association-in-fact:
There is a slim exception to the rule that the RICO person must be separate
from the RICO enterprise. Courts have routinely required a distinction when a
corporation has been alleged as both a RICO defendant and a RICO enterprise, but
a similar requirement has not been mandated when individuals have been named as
defendants and as members of an association-in-fact RICO enterprise. That rule
does not apply here, as the ... Plaintiffs' claim only implicates the corporate
defendants.
Bmdley, 527 E Supp. 2d at 652 n.52 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(dismissing RICO claims because, in part, plaintiffs had "not identified RICO persons
separate from their alleged enterprise").
205. 576 E3d 392 (7th Cir. 2009).
206. 1d. at 394.
207. 1d at 394-95.
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Federation constituted an association-in-fact.208 The Court was
unpersuaded, holding that "an association-in-fact enterprise must be
meaningfully distinct from the entities that comprise it such that the
entity sought to be held liable can be said to have controlled and
conducted the enterprise rather than merely its own affairs."209 Indeed,
the plaintiff had "done no more than describe the ordinary operation of
a garden-variety marketing arrangement between Golden Rule and the
Federation[, which] is not what RICO penalizes."210 Accordingly, the
Seventh Circuit rejected plaintiff's theory, holding, "This is insufficient
to state a RICO claim based on an association-in-fact enterprise.""'
D Pleadng Civ RICO ViolationsA-ferBoyle
To show the existence of an enterprise as a separate RICO
element, courts pre-Boyle would often hold that "[p]laintiffs ... need
to 'plead specific facts which establish that the association exists for
purposes other than sinply to commit the predicate acts."'212 Some
version of this rule may yet remain even though Boyle has relaxed the
standards for proving the structure of a RICO enterprise in the criminal
context.21 This is so because failure to show that the enterprise (as
opposed to its individual members) has a function other than to
effectuate the alleged scheme may still be fatal to a civil RICO claim.2 4
208. Id. at 398-99.
209. Id at 399.
210. Id at 400.
211. Id.; see also In re McCann, 268 E App'x 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating that
members of alleged association-in-fact were "merely partners in a scheme"); Gray v.
Upchurch, No. 5:05-cv-210-KS-MTP, 2007 WL 2258906, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 3, 2007)
(stating that an allegation that mortgage lenders "knew or should have known" that loans they
made were part of fraudulent scheme was insufficient to establish existence of or control over
enterprise); Do v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 512 E Supp. 2d 764, 769 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (stating
that "standard business arrangements" between agribusiness and bank did not constitute
"continuous RICO enterprise").
212. Rivera v. AT & T Corp., 141 E Supp. 2d 719, 726 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (emphasis
added) (quoting Elliot v. Foutas, 867 F.2d 877, 851 (5th Cir. 1989)).
213. See discussion supra Part IVA. At least one court has gone so far as to limit
Boyle to jury instructions only CIT Group/Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Krones, Inc., No. 9-432, 2009
WL 3579037, at *8 n.10 (WD. Pa. Sept. 16, 2009) ("Defendants' reliance on the Boyle
decision for the proposition that a plaintiff must plead structural features related to an
association in fact enterprise [is] misplaced. The Boyle court addressed the inadequacy of a
jury instruction, not a pleading.").
214. See, e.g., Tipton v. Northrop Grumman Corp., No. 08-1267, 2009 WL 2914365,
at *I1-12 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 2009) (holding that the plaintiffs' failure "to allege the existence
of an enterprise separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering ... is fatal to [their] RICO
claims"); Rivera, 141 E Supp. 2d at 726 ("Plaintiffs' allegations establish exactly the
opposite: that any association between Tele-Communications, Inc., AT & T Corporation, and
Time Warner, Inc. exists merely for the purposes of providing cable services in exchange for
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But even if not, Boyle leaves no doubt that an actionable association-
in-fact enterprise must exhibit at least two distinct characteristics:
namely, that it is an "ongoing organization" that functions as a
"continuing unit."
An "ongoing organization" is shown by the existence of some
sort of structure.215  To return to our running example, Golden Rule,
where a plaintiff "has done little more than plead facts suggesting the
existence of the marketing relationship between" two entities, the
"structural" piece of the RICO puzzle will remain missing.216 There,
the plaintiff did not identify any structures that limited or guided the
defendants in their execution of the alleged scheme, nor did he identify
a mechanism for distributing the fruits of the alleged fraud apart from
that typically found in ordinary insurance transactions (i.e., the insured
gets an insurance policy, the insurer gets a premium, the marketers get
a commission). 217 For the court, these pleading deficiencies suggested
a lack of requisite organization in the alleged association-in-fact.2 18
a monthly fee."). After Boyle, however, some courts appear more willing to infer the
existence of an enterprise "separate and apart" from the racketeering activities, as suggested
by the Court. See County of El Paso v. Jones, No. EP-09-CV-00 119-KC, 2009 WL 4730305,
at *18 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2009) (finding that the plaintiff did sufficiently allege existence
"separate and apart" from the alleged racketeering activities, but noting that "even if the
County failed to allege an existence separate and apart from Defendants' alleged racketeering
activities, it is not clear that this would prove fatal to its claim"). "Because Defendants'
'consulting services' organization functioned through its commission of the predicate
racketeering acts, the evidence establishing the association-in-fact and the pattern of
racketeering activity in the instant case may 'coalesce."' Id. (citing Boyle v. United States,
129 S. Ct. 2237, 2245 (2009)).
215. Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2244; Shaffer v. Williams, 794 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir.
1986).
216. Golden Rule, 576 E3d at 399.
217. Id. at 398-99. But see In re Actiq Sales & Mktg. Practices Litig., No. 07-4492,
2009 WL 2581717, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2009) ("Plaintiffs have not only alleged a
decision-making structure that goes beyond surface descriptions of the enterprise and
associate roles, but also details about the ongoing functions of the alleged enterprise,
descriptions of monetary and other incentives used to attract speakers and other participants
to the enterprise, specifics regarding the manner in which presentations are created to
allegedly mislead physicians about the efficacy of Provigil and Gabitril for certain conditions,
and how sales representatives were utilized in the course of Defendant's national marketing
scheme.").
218. See Elsevier Inc. v. W.H.P.R., Inc. 692 F. Supp. 2d 297, 307 (S.D.N.Y 2010) ("In
this post- Twombly era, I conclude that a plaintiff must allege something more than the fact
that individuals were all engaged in the same type of illicit conduct during the same time
period'"). But see Friedman v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., No. CV 06-6282 AHM (CTX),
2009 WL 3053711, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2009) (finding that "[p]laintiffs had adequately
alleged an ongoing organization, and that a RICO enterprise could arise from a contractual
relationship for ordinary financial services" as supported by the holding in Boyle that "an
association-in-fact enterprise need not have an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in
its pattern of racketeering activity").
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A plaintiff must also plead facts demonstrating a "continuing
unit."219 Thus, as with the "ongoing organization" element, a plaintiff
must demonstrate a structure sufficient to satisfy the "continuing unit"
element.220 To demonstrate the requisite enterprise continuity, a
plaintiff must allege facts showing that, for instance, key personnel
remained in positions throughout the operative period of the alleged
scheme.' Together, these pleading requirements should ensure that an
association-in-fact is a true "enterprise" and not a mere coordination of
individual acts and aims.
Even if a plaintiff sufficiently pleads the existence of an
enterprise, his RICO claims will still fail if he does not allege that the
"defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the
'enterpnisek affairs,' not just their own affairs."222 This requires the
plaintiff to plead and prove that each of the defendants participated in
the "operation" or "management" of the enterprise to the degree that it
has some part in directing the [enterprise's] affairs.223 This requires
more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,"
which-as noted above-is insufficient under Twombly22' And it
stretches the RICO fabric too far to suggest-as did the Golden Rule
plaintiff-that merely providing a service through a marketing
arrangement with otherwise unrelated corporate groups constitutes the
"conduct" of an enterprise.22 One reason that this element failed with
respect to the insurer in Golden Rule is that the acts alleged against
219. Eg., Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2246; Brunig v. Clark, 560 F3d 292, 297 (5th Cir.
2009); Jones, 2009 WL 4730305, at *19.
220. See Shaffer, 794 F2d at 1032 ("The RICO enterprise must have a common or
shared purpose and continuity of structure and personnel.").
221. See Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 855 F2d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1988)
("[T]he enterprise ... must be one that ... functions as a continuing unit." (internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1079 (1989); see also Calcasieu Marine Nat'l Bank v.
Grant, 943 E2d 1453, 1462 (5th Cir. 1991) ("The enterprise must have continuity of its
structure and personnel . . . .").
222. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993).
223. See Able Sec. & Patrol, LLC v. Louisiana, 569 F. Supp. 2d 617, 629 (E.D. La.
2008) (showing plaintiff must plead "how each.. . defendant[] performed acts in furtherance
of the enterprise" (emphasis added)).
224. Watts v. Allstate Indem. Co., No. S-08-1877 LKK/GGH, 2009 WL 1905047, at
*6 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jackson v. Sedgwick
Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 09-11529, 2010 WL 931864, at *22-25 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11,
2010) (dismissing plaintiffs' § 1962(c) claims for failure to meet the "operations or
management test" under Reves since plaintiffs' allegations that each Defendant "conducted or
participated, directly or indirect [sic], in the conduct of [an] enterprise's affairs" were
conclusory under Iqbal(alteration in original)).
225. Critchton v. Golden Rule Ins., 576 F.3d 392, 399-400 (7th Cir. 2009)
("Allegations that a defendant had a business relationship with the putative RICO enterprise
or that a defendant performed services for that enterprise do not suffice.").
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it-namely selling insurance and collecting a premium-had no
"nexus" with the management or operation of the alleged enterprise.
In United States v Cauble, the Fifth Circuit devised a conjunctive
three-part test for determining whether a sufficient nexus exists among
the enterprise, the defendant, and the pattern of racketeering: "(1) the
defendant has in fact committed the racketeering acts as alleged;
(2) the defendant's position in the enterprise facilitated his commission
of the racketeering acts[;] and (3) the predicate acts had some effect on
the lawful enterprise."22 Accordingly, there must be a nexus among
the enterprise, the defendant, and the pattern of racketeering activity
that includes an "enterprise-racketeering nexus ... distinct from the
defendant-racketeering connection."227 Thus, under the Golden Rule
example, even if one were to assume that selling insurance at
inadequately disclosed rates constitutes "racketeering," those acts lack
any meaningful nexus to the operation of the alleged enterprise. For as
the Golden Rule court held, allegations that an insurer offered its
services through a multiparty insurance marketing arrangement are
"insufficient to state a claim that [the insurer] controlled the operation
or management of [an enterprise]."228
To summarize: Boyle has made it much less difficult to plead an
association-in-fact enterprise. This does not mean, however, that all
previous enterprise standards are out the window. In fact, given the
strict pleading standards ushered in by Twombly, it is likely that the
lower courts will continue to police civil RICO cases for claims that
are little more than thinly disguised ordinary tort claims.
V. CONCLUSION
As the title of this Article suggests, the Supreme Court sorted out
an area of RICO jurisprudence that has been a mess for at least twenty
years, yet undone an area that was fairly well settled. We now know
that a plaintiff has standing to bring a RICO fraud claim if she can
show that the fraud-no matter to whom directed-caused money (or
some other benefit) to move directly from her pocket into the
defendant's pocket. We also know that in such a claim, reliance,
though a perhaps useful evaluative tool, is not an element of a civil
RICO claim and is best discarded as a point of argument in most cases.
To the contrary, we have lost the certainty brought by hundreds of
226. 706 E2d 1322, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Gordon, Crines That Count
Twice, supm note 5, at 184-89 (discussing the Cauble nexus test).
227. Cauble, 706 E2d at 1332.
228. Golden Rule, 576 E3d at 399.
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lower court cases telling us that an association-in-fact enterprise has to
have an existence separate and apart from the alleged pattern of
racketeering. Plaintiffs and defendants in civil RICO litigation will no
doubt spill much ink in the attempt to, on the one hand, label
conspiracies as "enterprises" and, on the other hand, to confine the
concept of enterprise to something that looks more or less like the lay
conception of a criminal gang.
